[Noisebridge-discuss] To the @#$er that broke into my member shelf...
garrettmace at gmail.com
Thu Mar 21 08:56:58 UTC 2013
On Mar 21, 2013, at 1:12 AM, "Robert \"Finny\" Merrill" <rfmerrill at berkeley.edu> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 8:22 PM, Garrett Mace <garrettmace at gmail.com> wrote:
>> It's still just treating a symptom. And it wouldn't solve the case where someone gets distracted for a moment and turns around to find their Macbook slipping quietly into someone else's backpack. It's a violent situation waiting to happen, and it's because the wrong people are in the space. Inclusiveness is a great idea but it is a failed experiment. Reset all the door codes and distribute new codes over the course of a few days using a traceable chain of trust. Repeat each time something gets stolen. It boggles my mind that this can happen as a chronic, expected problem and people accept it.
> Who are "the wrong people"?
> Are you trying to imply that there's some sort of "thief gene" and we
> should screen people for it?
Of course not...people are defined by their actions. But many of those actions are influenced by their core personality. There's no thief gene, but people who have stolen once will often steal again...especially if they don't get caught. There is no way to poke, prod, or interrogate someone to establish without a doubt that they're a trustworthy person. It's much easier to establish that they're untrustworthy: simply observe them committing a dishonorable action.
In order to protect yourself from untrustworthy people, you need to construct boundaries (physical obstructions or swift consequences) against anyone you cannot reasonably assume is trustworthy. The people you allow inside those boundaries are the ones who are more likely to be trustworthy due to the testimony of yourself, or others that you currently trust. Naturally, a new addition to the group will be viewed with some suspicion until some time has passed without any negative interactions. This system of boundaries and trust networks is precisely how most households minimize risk.
The "wrong people" are ones who have established untrustworthy behavior, and to a lesser extent the ones who are bypassing any system of boundaries and trust networks. The sad fact is that a trustworthy yet unknown person should expect to be viewed with some suspicion as part of an effective risk-mitigation practice.
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