[Noisebridge-discuss] Secheduling a Cryptography Talk at Noisebridge on 4 August

John Shutt john.d.shutt at gmail.com
Tue Jul 26 16:54:31 UTC 2016


Thanks, Peter! I’ll add it to the calendar.
> On Jul 24, 2016, at 11:36 PM, Peter Schwabe <peter at cryptojedi.org> wrote:
> 
> John Shutt <john.d.shutt at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Yep, a short abstract would be good. Thanks!
> 
> Dear John, dear all,
> 
> Sorry for the late response, how about this one:
> 
> 
> Title: Post-quantum crypto
> 
> Abstract: In 2012, Mark Ketchen, researcher at IBM, stated about large
>          quantum computers that they are "within reach" and estimated
>          a timespan of 10 to 15 years until such computers can be
>          built. It is not clear if Ketchen is right with this estimate,
>          it is not even clear if a large quantum computer will ever be
>          built. However, what is clear is that such a computer will be
>          able to break all asymmetric cryptography in wide use today.
>          More specifically, it will break in polynomial time systems
>          that are based on factoring (like RSA) and systems based on
>          the discrete logarithm (like DSA, and Diffie-Hellman key
>          exchange), including their elliptic-curve variants.
>          There are asymmetric cryptographic systems that, as far as we
>          know, are not broken by quantum computers, so called
>          "post-quantum cryptography". It is obvious that once large
>          quantum computers exist, the world will need to switch to such
>          post-quantum schemes. However, users who are concerned about
>          long-term security, have to switch to post-quantum schemes for
>          confidentiality already now: an attacker who records and
>          stores key exchanges today can go back in a decade or two and
>          use a quantum computer to attack them. 
>          In my talk I will give a brief overview of post-quantum crypto
>          and then highlight what we can, and should, already do today
>          to provide long-term security in cryptographic systems. In
>          particular, I will present the "NewHope" key exchange, which
>          is currently used in an experiment by Google and is one of the
>          candidates to be considered for post-quantum key exchange in
>          Tor.
> 
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Peter
> 



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